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Abstract
We study social choice functions that are robustly implemented in sequential
equilibria of extensive-form games on all common prior type spaces. We show that
the combination of strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, and no veto power is
a sucient condition for these implementation. Unlike robust implementation by
normal-form games, desirable social choice functions can be implemented even in
single-peaked voting or quasi-linear preferences environments.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of fully implementing a social choice function (SCF)
in incomplete information environments. In the spirit of “Wilson doctrine” (Wilson
[1987]), we consider full implementation where mechanisms do not rely on the features
of agents’ common knowledge about probability distributions on the agents’ types in
the same way of “robust implementation” by Bergemann and Morris [2005a,b]. We ex-
amine implementation by extensive-form games, where the mechanism designers con-
struct extensive-form games as their mechanisms not only normal-form games. Until
now, robust implementation has been studied only in implementation by normal-form
games. However, in the literature of full implementation, it is known that if designers
can design extensive-form games, then the larger class of SCFs can be implemented.
Our purpose is to determine whether this valuable property is applicable in the case of
robust implementation.
In the literature of full implementation with complete information Maskin [1999]
analyses implementation problems where an SCF must be attained by all Nash equilib-
ria refereed to as “Nash implementation”. He provides a necessary and almost sucient
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condition for Nash implementation, known as Maskin monotonicity. Since Maskin’s
formulation assumes that the agents have perfect information, the researches has been
dealing with implementation theory with incomplete information (see Postlewaite and
Schmeidler [1986], Palfrey and Srivastava [1989], Jackson [1991]). In incomplete in-
formation environments, the agents’ types are private information and they have beliefs
about the other agents’ types.
In the literature of incomplete information environments, the designers has been
allowed to use the information what beliefs the agents had. Many researchers have
criticized these assumptions about information since, in realistic implementation prob-
lems, the mechanism designers may not have the detail information of the agents’ prior
beliefs. In a novel approach, Bergemann and Morris [2005b,a] propose a new imple-
mentation concept, referred to as robust implementation. Robust implementation re-
quires that the implementation result of a mechanism must be robust to the assumption
of the information about the agents. They show that strategy-proofness is a neces-
sary condition for robust implementation of SCFs with private values.1 In addition,
Saijo et al. [2007] reveal a necessary and sucient condition for robust implementa-
tion. Strategy-proofness in itself does not imply the negative results for social decision
in some economic problems such as auction environments or single-peaked prefer-
ences environments. However, Saijo et al. [2007] reveal that robust implementation is
stronger than strategy-proofness; in fact, no SCFs can be robustly implemented in the
above two environments.
On the other hand, implementation by extensive-form games is an well-known
method to fully implement the larger class of SCFs than implementation by normal-
form games. If the agents have sequential rationality and the designer can design the
mechanisms as extensive-form games, the designer can exclude undesirable equilib-
ria by the equilibrium refinement and fully implement the larger class of SCFs.2 Our
purpose is to study robust sequential implementation; it is robust implementation in
sequential equilibria, which is a common solution concept of extensive-form games
developed by Kreps and Wilson [1982]. It corresponds to robust implementation in
Bergemann and Morris [2005a], which alternatively employs the Bayesian equilibria
of normal-form games. In the literature of extensive-form implementation with in-
complete information, many of the studies revealed sucient conditions on SCFs to be
implemented by extensive-form games by restricting their analyses to the environments
such as economic or private values environments.
Some researchers point out that implementation by extensive-form games is more
suitable in order not to depend on the agents’ prior beliefs than normal-form games.
Bergin and Sen [1998] emphasize that, in extensive-form implementation, the designer
can use posterior beliefs even if the SCF cannot be implemented by using only prior
beliefs. Duggan [1998] analyzes, with quasi-linear and private values preferences. a
sucient condition to implement the designer’s second best outcomes in sequential
1Bergemann and Morris [2005b] show that ex post incentive compatibility is necessary for partial imple-
mentation with robustness, which requires that there exists at least one equilibrium that achieves the SCF. In
private value environments, ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent to strategy-proofness.
2In the literature of implementation by extensive-form games, Moore and Repullo [1988] and Abreu and
Sen [1990] study implementation with complete information and Baliga [1999] and Brusco [2006] study
implementation with incomplete information.
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equilibria on all the agents’ prior beliefs when the designer permits arbitrarily small
perturbations of his SCF. their approaches are actually independent of robust imple-
mentation but their aim is the same as ours. We would like to answer the question
whether extensive-form implementation is robust to the assumption on information.
We provide a relatively simple sucient condition for robust sequential implemen-
tation by restricting our analysis to the case of private values; an SCF can be robustly
sequentially implemented if the SCF satisfies strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonic-
ity, and no veto power. This sucient condition implies that robust sequential imple-
mentation is significantly weaker than robust implementation by normal form games.
The mechanism in the proof of suciency theorem is similar to those of the studies in
this literature; it is composed of at most two rounds of announcements by the agents
and needs only one round in any equilibrium paths. 3 We consider the implication of
our sucient condition in two kinds of economically important environments: the envi-
ronments with single-peaked preferences and quasi-linear preferences. We show that,
with single-peaked preferences, the median voter rule environments can be robustly
sequentially implemented, and, with quasi-linear preferences, there exists at least one
surplus-maximizing SCF that can be robustly sequentially implemented. These results
contrast with the previously described results of robust implementation with normal-
form games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic notation and de-
fines robust implementation by extensive-form games. Section 3 provides a sucient
condition for this implementation and considers our sucient condition in single-
peaked preference environments and quasi-linear preferences environments. Section
4 concludes the paper.
2 Notation and Definitions
We consider a finite set of agents, N  f1; 2; : : : ; Ng. Let N  3. X is the set of
outcomes, the objects of social choice. For each i 2 N , agent i’s utility function
is ui : X ! R, and the class of the possible utility functions of agent i is Ui. Let
u = (u1; u2; : : : ; uN) and U  i2NUi. U is a countable set. It should be clear that
preferences depend only on an agent’s own information and not those of other agents.
We assume that preferences satisfy the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms.
An SCF is a function f : U ! X, which associates with each u 2 U a unique social
optimal f (u) in X.
A Type space
ti 2 Ti is agent i’s type, where Ti is a countable set for each i. Let T = i2NTi.
A type of agent i includes a description of his preference. Thus, there is a function
uˆi : Ti ! Ui with uˆi(ti) being agent i’s utility function when his type is ti. Let uˆ(t) =
(uˆ1(t1); uˆ2(t2); : : : ; uˆN(tN)). A type of agent i also includes a description of his beliefs
3In this regard, our mechanism is not a multi-stage game with complete information unlike many of the
studies. Brusco [1995] and Brusco [2006] also uses the mechanism that is not a multi-stage game in his
suciency theorem.
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about the types of the other agents; we describe ˆi(ti)[t i] as the probability assigned
by type ti to the other agents’ type profile t i. Now, a type space is a collection:
T = (Ti; uˆi; ˆi)i2N :
We assume that a type space T = (Ti; uˆi; ˆi)i2N satisfies the common prior assump-
tion.4 That is, there exists p 2 (T ) such that, for each i and ti,X
t0 i2T i
p(ti; t0 i) > 0
and
ˆi(ti)[t i] = p(ti; t i)P
t0 i2T i p(ti; t0 i)
:
Note that there is generally no relation between a preference type set U and a type
set T , which is defined by a type space T = (Ti; uˆi; ˆi)i2N ; It depends on the property
of a type space T . That is, there may exist a profile u 2 U such that uˆ(t) , u for each
t 2 T and there may exist a distinct pair of type profiles t; t0 2 T such that uˆ(t) = uˆ(t0).5
The concept of a type space helps us to analyze the implementation problems sig-
nificantly robust to the assumption on the agents’ private information, as we will see
later.
Extensive-form games and equilibrium
A mechanism M is an extensive-form game with incomplete information. A detailed
description of extensive-form game is provided in Selten [1975].6 h 2 H is a history
in the M, where H constitutes the set of histories. The set of terminals is a subset
¯H 2 H. An outcome function assigns an element in X to each terminal. For agent i, an
information set Ii 2 Ii is a subset of H; each non-terminal history h is an element of
exactly one information set of some agent. Each information set of an agent identifies
the set of histories that are indistinguishable for the agent when he reaches one of the
histories. An action set is assigned to each information set of the agents.
Given a type space T = (Ti; uˆi; ˆi)i2N , a pair (M;T ) denotes an (extensive-form)
game.
Let i 2 i be a behavior strategy of agent i; i assigns a probability distribution
on the action set to each pair (Ii; ti) 2 Ii  Ti. Let  = (1; 2; : : : ; N).
i is a belief system of agent i. It assigns to each pair (Ii; ti) 2 Ii  Ti a probability
distribution on Ii  T i. Let  = (1; 2; : : : ; N).
We state “a belief profile  is Bayes consistent with a strategy profile ” if and
only if beliefs are updated from an information set to the next information set by using
Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
4Although we require the common prior in accordance with the standard definition of sequential equilib-
rium, our sucient theorem can be obtained with larger type spaces. In fact, the proof does not depend the
commonness of the agents’ prior distributions.
5Bergemann and Morris [2005b] and Bergemann and Morris [2005a] provides a more detailed analysis
of type spaces
6For more details of an extensive-form mechanism, refer to Bergin and Sen [1998].
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We write E(uˆi)[ji(Ii; ti); (Ii; ti)] as the expected utility of type ti with belief i
when information set Ii is attained and strategy profile  are employed by the agents.
A sequential equilibrium (or equilibrium) assessment (; ) on game (M;T ) is a
pair of a strategy profile and belief profile that satisfies the following two conditions:
Sequential rationality For each i 2 N , Ii 2 Ii, ti 2 Ti, and 0i 2 i,
E(uˆi)[ji(Ii; ti); Ii; ti]  E(uˆi)[(0i ;  i)ji(Ii; ti); Ii; ti]:
Consistency There exists a sequence (n)1
n=1 of proper mixed strategies converging to
 with Bayes consistent beliefs (n)1
n=1 converging to .
A proper mixed strategy is a strategy that assigns positive probabilities to all actions
in each action set at each pair (Ii; ti) 2 Ii  Ti.
Let SEO((M;T ); t) be the set of sequential equilibrium outcomes of game (M;T )
at type t.7
Robust sequential implementation
Note that our definitions about an extensive-form mechanism and sequential equilib-
rium are basically equivalent to the definitions in the traditional studies of extensive-
form implementation, except we describe them with a concept of a type space ex-
pressly. In the traditional notation, a type space is treated as given; the description of
what type set each agent has and what beliefs each agent has on the other agents’ type
profiles are treated as a part of the environment. On the other hand, we separate the
descriptions from the environments and define a type space expressly.
The definition of non-robust extensive-form implementation can be described with
a concept of a type space as follows:
Definition 1 (Sequential Implementation). A mechanism M sequentially implements
an SCF f on a type space T = (Ti; uˆi; ˆi)i2N if and only if SEO((M;T ); t) = f (uˆ(t)) for
each t 2 S .
This definition corresponds to the implementation using sequential equilibria in
Bergin and Sen [1998] and Baliga [1999].8 It requires full implementation; every se-
quential equilibrium must attain the SCF. And, it is not robust; whether a mechanism
M sequentially implements an SCF depends on the type space, since a type space in-
fluences the game that the agents will play and the sequential equilibrium of the game.
Next, we consider robust implementation.
Definition 2 (Robust Sequential Implementation on Common Prior Type Spaces). A
mechanismM robustly sequentially implements an SCF f if and only ifM sequentially
7Although we define implementation by employing sequential equilibrium as the solution concept, our
results are also satisfied by employing slightly weak solution concepts such as weak perfect Bayesian equi-
librium Mas-Colell et al. [1995].
8Note that implementation is required only if type profiles is an element in S . That is, the designer
wants to implement at type profile t 2 T only if t is considered possible by an agent in N. Our definition
corresponds to robust Bayesian implementation in Saijo et al. [2007].
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implements f on all type spaces. An SCF f is robustly sequentially implementable if
and only if there exists a mechanism that robustly sequentially implements f on all type
spaces.
Robust sequential implementation requires that the implementation result is robust
on the assumption of the type space.Robust implementation is stronger than implemen-
tation with all prior beliefs on preference type set U. Since each type space determines
a type set independently of U, robust implementation can consider more general struc-
tures of private information than U.
3 Implementation and Monotonicity
Now, we introduce some conditions associated with robust implementability.
SP requires that truth-telling is a dominant strategy in a direct revelation game for
each agent.
Definition 3 (Strategy-Proofness). An SCF f is strategy-proof (SP), if for each u 2 U,
i 2 N and u0i 2 Ui,
ui( f (u))  ui( f (u0i ; u i)):
SP is also a necessary condition for robust sequential implementation. The reason
is that SP is a necessary condition for partial robust implementation in Bayesian equi-
libria (see Bergemann and Morris [2005b]) and sequential equilibrium is a refinement
of Bayesian equilibrium.
Remark 1. If an SCF f can be robustly sequentially implemented, then f satisfies SP.
Maskin [1999] provides that Maskin monotonicity as a necessary condition for
Nash implementation – implementation in Nash equilibria with complete information.
In our environments, Maskin monotonicity is described as follows.
Definition 4 (Maskin Monotonicity (Maskin [1999])). An SCF f is Maskin monotonic
(MM) if and only if, for each u; u0 2 U,
8i 2 N; 8x 2 X : ui( f (u))  ui(x) =) u0i( f (u))  u0i(x);
then,
f (u) = f (u0):
change In other words, Maskin monotonicity implies the following; if an SCF
chooses an outcome x when the preference profile is u and any agents does not newly
strictly prefer any outcome to x when the preference profile change into u0, then the
SCF remains to choose x at profile u0.
For our purposes, it is useful to state the above definition in its contrapositive form.
That is, an SCF f satisfies MM if and only if, for each u; u0 2 U with f (u) , f (u0),
there exists i and x such that
ui(x) > ui( f (u0)) & u0i( f (u0))  u0i(x): (1)
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Given an SCF satisfying MM, we state “u0 2 U is an unacceptable deception of
u” if f (u) , f (u0). Let UD(u)  U be the set of “unacceptable deceptions of u”. For
each u; u0 2 U with u0 2 UD(u), i(u; u0) 2 N and x(u; u0) 2 X denote the agent and the
outcome satisfying equation (1).
Maskin [1999] shows that an SCF can be implemented in Nash equilibria if the
SCF satisfies MM and no veto power. Let Bi(u) be the set of best outcomes of ui on X.
Definition 5 (No Veto Power (Maskin [1999])). An SCF f satisfies no veto power if
and only if, for each u and a,
x 2 B j(u) for each j , i =) f (u) = x:
No veto power requires that if an outcome is considered the best outcome for N   1
agents, then the outcome is chosen by the SCF. No veto power is regarded as for a weak
condition; in fact, any SCF satisfies no veto power with many economic environments
including the cases with quasi-linear preferences (we will see later in this section).
The following theorem provides a sucient condition for robust sequential imple-
mentation.
Theorem 1. If an SCF f satisfies SP, MM, and no veto power, then f can be robustly
sequentially implemented.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix. 
The proof is constructive. The mechanism in the proof is a game with one round
of signaling (Bergin and Sen [1998]), where each agent announces his own preference
type at the first stage and any equilibria on any type spaces do not go beyond the first
stage. SP assures that truth telling at the first stage is an equilibrium strategy in the
mechanism on any type spaces. And by MM and no veto power, it can be shown that
all equilibria attain the SCF on any type spaces. Intuitively, MM has the following
eect on the mechanism; if the true preference profile is u 2 U but the agents report
u0 satisfying f (u) , f (u0) at the first stage, then agent i(u; u0) must strictly prefer to
confess the deception and achieve x(u; u0) instead of f (u0) at a second stage, and it
implies that some agent prefers to move the game to the second stage.
Our approach is linked to that of Baliga [1999], which shows that if an SCF satis-
fies three conditions referred to as incentive compatibility, preference reversal, and the
economic environment, then the SCF is sequentially implementable. Incentive compat-
ibility corresponds to SP in our theorem and preference reversal corresponds to MM in
our theorem. No veto power necessarily holds in the economic environment. We use
MM instead of preference reversal to assure that moving the game to the second stage
achieves the same outcome as the outcome achieved by not moving the second stage
even if no agent confesses in any second stages.
There are some studies about the relation between SP and MM. For one thing, if an
SCF satisfies SP and non-bossy, then the SCF satisfies MM (see, for example, lemma
2 of Barbera and Jackson [1995]). Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
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Definition 6 (Non-Bossiness9). An SCF f is non-bossy if and only if, for each u 2 U,
i 2 N, and u0i 2 Ui,
ui( f (u)) = ui( f (u0i ; u i)) =) f (u) = f (u0):
Corollary 1. If an SCF satisfies SP, no veto power, and non-bossiness, then the SCF
can be robustly sequentially implemented.
This corollary can be used for the SCFs that satisfy SP and non-bossiness; as an
example, we consider the median voter rule with single-peaked preferences environ-
ments.
Single-peaked voting
The set of alternative is X = [0; 1]. Each preference ui 2 Ui of i 2 N is single-peaked;
for each ui 2 Ui, there exists a peak p(ui) 2 X such that ui is strictly increasing on
[0; p(ui)] and strictly decreasing on [p(ui); 1].
In the case where N is odd, the median voter rule is the leading example of SCFs.
The median voter rule assigns to each profile u 2 U the N+12 -th largest peak of the
profile. It is known that the median voter rule satisfies SP, Pareto eciency, and non-
bossiness (see Barbera and Jackson [1995]).
By Saijo et al. [2007], it is known that the median voter rule is not robustly im-
plemented by normal-form games. However, since the median voter rule obviously
satisfies no veto power, it follows from corollary 1 that the median voter rule can be
robustly sequentially implemented.
Quasi-linear preferences
Next, we consider environments with quasi-linear preferences. In these environments,
the set of outcomes can be described as
X  f(y;m1;m2; : : : ;mN)jy 2 Y;mi 2 R 8ig;
where y is a social decision and mi is a transfer to i. Let m  (m1;m2; : : : ;mN). In
addition, for each preference ui 2 Ui, there exists a valuation function vi : Y ! R
satisfying
ui(y;m) = vi(y) + mi:
Thus, we can directly describe a valuation function vi as the alternative of the corre-
sponding utility function ui. Let the set of the valuation functions be Vi for each i. An
SCF f can be described as a function on V . An SCF f can be described as a pair of
two functions, y f (on Y) and m f (on R): f (v) = (y f (v);m f (v)) for each v. An SCF f
is surplus-maximizing if y f maximizes the social surplus, described as Pi vi(y)   c(y),
where c(y) is the cost of taking a social decision y.
Auction is an important example of environments with quasi-linear preferences. By
Saijo et al. [2007], it is showed that, in auction, any surplus-maximizing SCF does not
9Our definition is the same as the definition of Saijo et al. [2007].
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robustly implemented by normal-form games. However, we can show that there exist
ecient SCFs robustly implemented by sequential equilibria; an SCF associated with
second price auction is an example. More generally, robust sequential implementa-
tion and surplus-maximizing problems are generally compatible in environments with
quasi-linear preferences.
Now, we say “an SCF f is associated with a Groves mechanism” if f is surplus-
maximizing and m f satisfies the following conditions: for each i and v,
m
f
i (v) =
X
j,i
v j(y f (v))   c(y f (v)) + i(v i);
where  is an arbitrary function on V i. It is known that Groves mechanism satisfies
SP (see Groves [1973], Groves and Loeb [1975]). Now, we can obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists a SCF associated with a Groves mechanism and satisfies MM
in environments with quasi-linear preferences.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix 
In our environments, since each agent has no best outcome, no veto power is always
satisfied. From proposition 2 and lemma 1, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In quasi-linear preferences environments, there exists an SCF that is
surplus-maximizing and robustly sequentially implemented.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper analyses robust implementation as sequential equilibria on all common prior
type spaces. We show that an SCF can be robustly sequentially implemented if the SCF
satisfies strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, and no veto power. SCFs can be
implemented in single-peaked voting and quasi-linear preferences environments. Since
it is known that in these environments, robust implementation with normal-form games
is not functional, we find that implementation with extensive-form games is an eective
measure to satisfy incentive constraints even in the case of robust implementation.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Let an SCF f satisfy no veto power, SP and MM. Since f sat-
isfies MM, for each pair of profiles u; u0 2 U with f (u) , f (u0), there exist an agent
j(u; u0) and an outcome x(u; u0) 2 X such that
u j(u;u0)( f (u))  u j(u;u0)(x(u; u0)) & u0j(u;u0)( f (u)) > u0j(u;u0)(x(u; u0)):
We now show that the following mechanism M robustly sequentially implements
f .
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Main stage: Each agent i announces a list (ui; n1i ; u0; xi) 2 UiN+U X (where N+
is the set of non-negative integers). We term the announced preference profile (at
the Main-stage) as the profile of the first components of the agents’ announce-
ments.
Case 1 If (i) the announced preference profile is u, (ii) there exists i 2 N announc-
ing (ui; n1i ; u0; x) such that n1i > 0 and f (u) , f (u0), and (iii) each j , i
announces n1j = 0, then go to sub-stage (u; u0).
Case 2 If the announced preferences are u, and either
 all members announce 0 as the second components or
 there exists i announcing (ui; n1i ; u0; xi) such that n1i > 0 and f (u) =f (u0) and each j , i announces n1j = 0,
then f (u) is implemented.
Case 3 Otherwise, xi is implemented, where i  min arg max jfn1j g.
Sub-stage (u; u0) Only two agents play at this sub-stage: agent i announcing n1i > 0 at
the main stage and agent j(u; u0). In what follows, we simply write j instead of
j(u; u0). In the sub-stage, agent j does not be informed about what number agent
i announces at the main stage. In this sub-stage, each agent k 2 fi; jg announces
a non-negative integer n2k .
Case 1 If n2j = 0, then f (u) is implemented.
Case 2 If n1i = 1 and n2j > 0, then x(u; u0) is implemented.
Case 3 Otherwise, Bk(uk) is implemented, where k  min arg maxk2fi; jg n2k and
uki is the first component of the announce in the first stage.
Fix a type space T = (Ti; uˆi; ˆi)i2N . We first show that any sequential equilibrium
on game (M;T ) attains the SCF f if there exists an equilibrium in the game.
Claim 1: For each t 2 S , SEO((M;T ); t)  f (uˆ(t)).
We first consider a condition for (; ) in each sub-stage. Fix an information set of
agent i where a type ti of i announced n1i > 1 and the game reached a sub-stage (u; u0).
Step 1: If  assigns a positive probability to a history (h; t) in the information set,
then  must achieve either f (u) or B(ti) after the history. Additionally, if uˆ j[t j](x(u; u0)) >
uˆ j[t j]( f (u)) for j  j(u; u0), then x 2 B(uˆi(ti)) must be achieved.
In mechanism M, when j chooses n2j > 0, i can obtain Bi(uˆi(ti)) by choosing
n2i > n
2
j . Thus, since () satisfies sequential rationality and u has a lower bound
on X, if  j(t j) chooses n2j > 0 with a positive probability at the sub-stage,  must
obtain Bi(uˆi(ti)) by choosing suciently large n2j when  j(t j) indeed chooses n2j > 0.
On the other hand, if j indeed chooses n2j = 0, then mechanism M implements f (u)
independently of the choice of i. Thus, either f (u) or B(ti) is achieved after the history.
Next consider the case where uˆ j[t j](x(u; u0)) > uˆ j[t j]( f (u)). In this case, choos-
ing n2j = 0 is not a best response for j to any choice of i since, for each n2i , j can
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obtain, by choosing n2j > n2i , B j(uˆ j(t j)) or x(u; u0), which satisfy uˆi[ti](Bi(uˆi(ti))) 
uˆi[ti](x(u; u0)) > uˆi[ti]( f (u)). Thus, since (:) satisfies sequential rationality and u(X)
has lower bound,  j(t j) does not assign any positive probability to n2j = 0 and  must
obtain Bi(uˆi(ti)) in the case.
Next, we consider a condition of (; ) related to the main stage.
Step 2: If (t) achieves x , f (uˆ(t)) at a type t 2 S with a positive probability,
then i(ti ) assigns probability 1 to n1i > 0 at the main stage.
By no vet power, there exists i such that x < B(uˆi(ti )). Fix such i and x. Assume
by contradiction that i(ti ) chooses n1i = 0 with a positive probability at the main stage.
Since (; ) satisfies sequential rationality and u has a lower bound on X, (t)
must achieve B(ti ) when k(tk) of some k , i indeed chooses n1k > 0. From x < Bi(ti ),
it follows that x is implemented when, for each k , i, k(tk) indeed chooses n1k = 0.
Then, x is implemented as the result of either Case 1 of the main stage or Case 1 of
the sub-stage after ti chooses n1i > 0. From Step 1 and x < Bi(ti ), it follows that (t)
announces, with a positive probability, a preference profile u 2 U with x = f (u) at
the main stage. Thus, when i(ti ) indeed chooses n1i = 0, (t) achieves f (u) with
a positive probability as the result of case 1 in the main stage. However, since u has
a lower bound on X, Step 1 implies that type ti can strictly improve his payo by
choosing a suciently large n1i in the main stage. It contradicts the assumption that
(; ) satisfies sequential rationality. Thus, i(ti ) must choose n1i > 0 at the main
stage.
Since (; ) satisfies sequential rationality and u has a lower bound on X, Step
2 implies that x 2 B(tk) for each k , i. However, from no veto power, it implies
x = f (uˆ(t)) and contradicts the assumption. Thus, (; ) achieves only f (uˆ(t)) at each
t 2 S if an sequential equilibrium exists and Claim 1 is proved.
We next show that there exists an equilibrium on game (M;T ).
Claim 2: The following assessment ;  is an sequential equilibrium on game
(M;T ).
 Each type ti of each agent i announces (uˆi(ti); 0; u; x) at the main stage, where
u 2 U and x 2 X is arbitrarily chosen.
 At sub-stage (u; u0), for j = j(u; u0), each type t j chooses n2j = 0 if uˆ j[t j]( f (u)) 
uˆ j[t j](x(u; u0)), and n2j1 otherwise.
 At sub-stage (u; u0) after ti chooses n1i = 1, ti chooses n2i = 0.
 At sub-stage (u; u0) after ti chooses n1i > 1, ti chooses n2i = 2.
 At sub-stage (u; u0), for j = j(u; u0), k(tk) of each type tk assigns positive prob-
ability’s only to histories where agent i chooses n1i = 1.
First, we consider sequential rationality. Since f satisfies SP, each agent cannot
improve his payo by choosing another payo type at the main stage. If an agent i
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deviates at the main-stage and chooses n1i > 0 and the game goes to a sub-stage (u; u0),
since each t j 2 T j of j = j(u; u0) always announces his true preference type in the
main stage, it follows that uˆ j[t j]( f (u))  uˆ j[t j](x(u; u0)) and he chooses n2j = 0. Thus,
agent i cannot aect the implemented outcome by deviating and chooses n1i > 0 at the
main-stage.
At sub-stage (u; u0) after agent i announces ni > 0, since each t j 2 T j of j = j(u; u0)
believes agent i chooses n1i = 1 at the main stage, he cannot improve his (expected)
payo by changing the number. On the other hand, for ti announcing n1i = 1 at the
main stage, his choice at sub-stage has no eect on the outcome. For ti at the sub-
stage after he chooses nii > 1, since t j chooses 0 or 1, he can obtain a best outcome by
choosing 2. Therefore, this assessment is sequential rational.
Finally, we show this assessment satisfies consistency. Assume a sequence of per-
fect mixed strategies (n)1
n=1 converging to  such that for each type of each agent i,
the probability choosing n1i = 1 at the main stage suciently faster converges to zero
than the summation of the probability choosing all n1i > 1. Since the sequence of belief
systems (n)1
n=1 associated with (n)1n=1 converges to ,  is consistent. Then, (; ) is
an equilibrium. 
Proof of lemma 1. Let SM(v)  Y be the set of surplus maximizing social decisions at
v. By the assumption, SM(v) , ; for each v 2 V .
Now, we introduce a pairwise relation y on U for each y 2 Y as the following:
v y v0 if and only if, for each i and y0 2 Y ,
v0i(y)   v0i(y0)  vi(y)   vi(y0): (2)
A relation v y v0 is equivalent to the fact that, for each i 2 N and x; x0 2 X with
x  (y;m) and x0  (y0;m0),
vi(y) + mi  vi(y0) + m0i =) v0i(y) + mi  v0i(y0) + m0;
Then, an SCF f = (y f ;m f ) satisfies MM if and only if for each u; u0, whenever
u y f (u) u0, f (u) = f (u0). In the following, we write “ an social decision rule y f is
Maskin monotonic” if and only if for each u; u0, whenever u y f (u) u0, f (u) = f (u0).
It is sucient for the proof of Lemma 1 to show that there exists a Maskin monotonic
and surplus maximizing social decision rule y f . Let us consider the following clam.
Claim 3: For each v; v0 2 V and y 2 Y if y 2 E(v) and v y v0, then y 2 E(v0) 
E(v).
Since y 2 E(v) implies that Pi vi(y)   c(y)  Pi vi(y0)   c(y0) for each y0 2 Y and
v y v0 implies that Pi(v0i(y)   v0i(y0))  Pi(vi(y)   vi(y0)),X
i
v0i(y)   c(y) 
X
i
v0i(y0)   c(y0) for each y0 2 Y:
Then, y 2 E(v0). Since y0 2 E(v0) implies thatPi v0i(y)  c(y) = Pi v0i(y0)  c(y0) and
v y v0 implies thatPi(v0i(y) v0i(y0))  Pi(vi(y) vi(y0)), it follows thatPi vi(y0) c(y0) 
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i vi(y)   c(y). From y 2 E(v), it follows that y0 2 E(u). Thus, E(v0)  E(v) and Claim
3 is proved.
Now, define a social decision rule y f in the following way: let n = 1 and ¯V1  V ,
then,
Step 1: Choose a payo type profile vn 2 ¯Vn and yn 2 E(vn) arbitrarily.
Step 2: Let y f (v) = yn for each v 2 Vn  fv 2 ¯Vnjyn 2 E(v)g.
Step 3: Define ¯Vn+1  ¯Vn n Vn.
Step 4: If ¯Vn+1 , ;, then increase n to n + 1 and return to Step 1.
Since V is a countable set, a social decision rule y f can be defined in this way. It is
clear that y f is surplus-maximizing. If a pair of v 2 Vn and v0 2 Vn0 satisfies v y f (v) v0,
since Claim 3 implies y f (v) 2 E(v0)  E(v), it follows that n = n0. Thus, y f is Maskin
monotonic. 
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